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A STUDY OF PRIDE
IN LIGHT OF PASTORAL COUNSELING

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Doctor of Religion

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEMS, GOALS AND LIMITATIONS

In a period of transition pastoral counseling faces an identity crisis. It cannot derive its identity from any particular school or schools of psychotherapy; nor can it know itself solely from biblical heritage, church history or priestly function. Its identity depends upon integrating the ultimate perspective of the Christian faith with the practical wisdom of science. The basic problem is to maintain this difficult balance. Herein lies the "narrow ridge" which pastoral counseling must tread if it is to find its home.

I. THE PROBLEM

Tension Within the Pastoral Counselor.

Tension arises within the pastoral counselor from a lack of understanding of his role as a pastoral counselor. On the one hand the pastoral counselor is a theologian who carries out and conveys the gospel through the traditions of the scripture and the church. On the other hand, the pastoral counselor is a person specialized in the art of psychotherapy who uses its methodology to heal persons. The question arises: can a pastor justify his mastering two disciplines? Isn't it enough to learn just

the discipline of theology without attempting to tackle that of psychotherapy? The answer is that the gospel must be proclaimed within the context of human need. This means using the insights and practical wisdom that any discipline can offer to fulfill those needs. Psychotherapy offers the best knowledge available in healing persons through relationships. If counseling is one of the functions of the pastor, then the discipline of counseling is a necessary part of a pastor's education. It is not a question, however, of dispensing one without the other. Both are necessary. Rather, the question is one of alliance and cooperation.

Tension Within Pastoral Counseling.

The problem of identity is reflected in the confusion about the unique nature and function of pastoral counseling. An examination of three common misconceptions reveal the tension resulting from a blurred understanding of pastoral counseling. They are: pastoral counseling as subject matter, pastoral counseling as procedure and pastoral counseling as a role.

Pastoral counseling as subject matter. This view says that pastoral counseling limits itself to certain material to the exclusion of other kinds. Thus, pastoral counseling happens when the minister and a member or

members of his church discuss Christian concepts. Here the pastor focuses on the parishioner's faith in Christ but not about his inability to trust those close to him. Pastoral counseling, understood in this sense, is a distortion of the relation between the secular and sacred.¹ Content that does not appear to be spiritual may be relevant to the spiritual on a deeper level. No matter where the boundary line between the secular and the sacred is drawn, subject matter is an inadequate way to define pastoral counseling. Although there is some truth in the fact that in a parish counseling situation there may be a focus upon certain kinds of content more often than others, accent upon content as a way to define pastoral counseling would soon lead to an artificial world in which practical concerns are separated from ultimate ones.

Pastoral counseling as procedure. In this misconception counseling is considered pastoral if the pastor uses a technique which is thought appropriate to religious purposes. Here the pastor is either authoritarian or Rogerian because he feels that one particular method or the other is the only one that embodies the

¹LeRoy Aden, "Pastoral Counseling as Christian Perspective," in Peter Homans (ed.) The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 165.

spirit of Christianity. Although some methods, such as client-centered therapy which stresses the counselee's worldview with unconditional positive regard, are more appropriate to the concerns of pastoral counseling, it is dangerous to define pastoral counseling at the level of methods because the same ends can be reached by any number of ways therapeutically.²

Pastoral counseling as a role. This way of seeing pastoral counseling assumes that a social worker or psychiatrist could not be doing pastoral counseling because they are not ministers of the church. It is true in one sense that there are certain persons who are set aside for specialized activities but there is no necessary connection between activity and office.³ It is obvious that all pastors are not qualified to do pastoral counseling. It is just as possible for a psychotherapist in some instances to be more of a pastoral counselor than a minister might be.

Tension Between Psychotherapy and Theology.

The problem of identity within the pastoral counselor and within the profession of pastoral counseling itself is compounded by a history of misunderstanding the

²Ibid., p. 166.

³Ibid., p. 167.

grounds for dialogue between psychology and theology. The problem lies with two distinct methodologies. One developed out of a scientific community and the other from a community of faith. Peter Homans analyzes the relationship of psychology to theology on the American scene in terms of models.⁴

The first model was the "Psychology of Religion" model. It was articulated by William James and Hall who took the methods from their psychology to interpret the meaning of religion.⁵ From their point of view religion was understood as a power, force or energy experienced by the individual. The consequence was that religion was a conversion experience. The individual encounters God, alone. This personal experience was characterized by feelings of guilt, worthlessness and a low self-esteem. The resolution of the conversion experience led to relationship with others and away from guilt and isolation.⁶ It was an unforgettable event of the past which one would refresh periodically his life-orientation.

The professional context for this group found its identity in the fact that they were either psychologists,

⁴Peter Homans, "Toward a Psychology of Religion," in Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁵Ibid., p. 56.

⁶Ibid., pp. 56-57.

psychotherapists or educators who were essentially interested in human behavior. They were not interested in the professional sense with either the institution of the church or theology. Both theology and the institutional church were viewed as proper objects of psychological analysis instead of a community of faith which they themselves identified.⁷

The psychology of religion model produced a split between psychology and religion. Psychology developed into psychoanalysis and theology adopted existentialism.⁸ Both psychology and theology in these forms were dissociated from any concern with religion. Psychoanalysis rejected religious experience in favor of psychological categories and existentialism rejected it for theological existence.

The splitting of the psychology of religion model into theology and psychology led to two additional models: The "pastoral psychology" model and the "theology-psychology" model. The pastoral psychology model is a functional use of psychology and psychotherapy by the practical needs of the church. This model is directed to a broad interpretation of dynamic psychoanalytically oriented psychology such as that of Freud and of the neo-Freudian and Rogerian schools.⁹

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 58.

⁹Ibid., p. 61.

The problem was that the pastoral psychology model substituted the psychotherapeutic experience for the conversion experience of the psychologists of religion. Thus, it was simply a replacement of the inner demands and the freedom of the religious experience for a therapeutic relationship and a dynamic psychological understanding of personal development.¹⁰ In this sense religious experience is related to the entire developmental life-span of the individual. This model could do this because of its theological assumption that "a dimension of faith transcends all forms of religious experience."¹¹

The theology-psychology model interprets psychology from a theological methodology. Homans describes the theology-psychology model in this manner.

The third model gives us a general and firm consensus with regard to the proper place of psychology in relation to the work of the theologian, and to the place of psychological process in his normative understanding of the development of the person. That is to say, it has approached psychology with its own pressing problems in mind, that of the theological method and that of theological anthropology. This model thus provides a careful and sophisticated interpretive integration of the proper place and limits of psychology in the theological enterprise.¹²

The exponents of this theological-psychology model according to Homans are Barth, Brunner, Tillich and

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 72.

¹² Ibid., p. 62.

Reinhold Niebuhr, especially as John B. Cobb interprets them in his Living Options in Protestant Theology.¹³

Whereas the representatives of the pastoral psychology model, Carrol Wise and Paul Johnson, focus upon the power of dynamic psychology to purify and clarify distortions of faith in the parishioners' existence, the representatives of the theology-pastoral model are concerned with the possibly reductive effects of psychology upon an authentic theological understanding of faith.

Moreover, the pastoral psychological model focuses upon the experiencing of a person at all times and thereby implying that the end point of a person's development is faith. This they call a theological self-understanding.¹⁴ However, the theology-psychology model sees psychological growth as a part-process. It asserts that psychology can tell us about the dissociations within the self, but not about the self in its fullness or ultimate integrity. The basic assumption here is that theological reality transcends psychological reality just as the self transcends its body, mind and situation.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 63.

II. OVERVIEW OF STUDY

This is a study of the origins and phenomenology of pride from a theological and a psychodynamic perspective. Its purpose is three-fold: (a) to explore the authentic grounds for dialogue between theology and psychotherapy; (b) to delineate the distinctive character of pastoral counseling; and (c) to integrate these two different studies of pride into a revised Christian model of "man as sinner."

This study will analyze Camilla Anderson's psychodynamic view of pride and Reinhold Niebuhr's theological view of pride as basic sin. Dr. Anderson's perspective of grandiosity (Anderson's term for pride) takes its meaning from within the framework of her "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy." Her approach to therapy is discovering and changing assumptions--the determinates of behavior. Grandiosity is the basis of the structure and function of assumption formation and manifestation.

Anderson is currently the chief consultant psychiatrist at the Chino Institute for Women. According to Robert Harper, Camilla Anderson belongs to the school of "dynamic-cultural psychoanalyst" linking her to Sullivan,

Fromm and Horney.¹⁵ However, Anderson's new orientation in assumption-centered therapy places her in the school of Reality Therapy.

Niebuhr is one of the giant theologians of the 20th century. He has tremendously influenced American Protestantism in the area of political thought and social ethics. Niebuhr has a dialectical methodology. He analyzes pride as sin from the pole of human experience and history and unbelief as sin from the other pole of faith and revelation. Both are descriptions of the basic disorder in human existence. The importance of pride in Niebuhr's theology is expressed in Paul Tillich's comment on the role of pride in the former's theology. "He derives sin basically from pride. There is no word in all his writing and preaching which is more often used than the word pride."¹⁶ Niebuhr's writings extend from a systematic discourse of man in his important book The Nature and Destiny of Man to thousands of articles in various magazines and periodicals through a span of forty years covering all phases of American life.

¹⁵Robert Harper, Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 62.

¹⁶Harold R. London (ed.), Reinhold Niebuhr (Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1962), p. 38.

The theological and psychodynamic study of pride in regard to Niebuhr and Anderson will be evaluated in the light of Albert Outler's four criteria for dialogue. Here the humanistic and naturalistic presuppositions of psychotherapy will be examined to show the areas of conflict and cooperation between Anderson and Niebuhr in terms of pride. The result of the evaluation will be the basis for revising Niebuhr's model of man as sinner.

Criteria for Authentic Dialogue.

Outler points out the problem which Christianity faces in respect to worldly knowledge is the place where theology must resolve its tension with psychological insight.

Christians must seek to understand the world they live in by the standard methods of empirical inquiry, and they must also judge their worldly wisdom by the final wisdom of the Gospel. Christianity must seek alliance with valid human wisdom, and it must at every point resist the rivalry of every merely human gospel.¹⁷

The problem accents the need for dialogue. Christianity depends upon the practical wisdom from the men who are most sensitive and concerned about the well-being of man. Psychotherapeutic theories are shaped by ultimate values which religion espouses. Both complement one another if

¹⁷ Albert C. Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), p. 51.

seen in the right context. From the standpoint of theology the practical wisdom which any discipline may offer is colored and intertwined with faith claims about the nature and destiny of man. It is therefore the task of theology to confront rival faith claims and to replace inadequate Christian practical wisdom with sound empirical ones.

One of the main contentions of this study is that dialogue is possible but only if there is a consistent and firm distinction between practice and theory respectively for psychotherapy and theology. Cooperation can take place only when the practical guidance and insight which psychotherapy affords is separated from quasi-scientific humanism which has been closely associated with the development of modern psychology. On the other hand, theology must distinguish the gospel of Jesus Christ from the borrowed psychologies of its church history. Outler writes:

It is inevitable, therefore, that thoughtful Christians should be deeply interested in psychotherapy and its import for Christianity. For Christianity has a common stake in the very same problems of human health and well-being. The Gospel began as a message about the fullness of human life in Christ and it has a long history of "the care of souls" and a ministry to the whole range of human needs and interests. But the Christian cura animarum has always had to depend, for its psychological categories, upon the prevailing doctrines of each particular age through which the Church has passed. The psychological inadequacies which we can now so readily see in earlier ages are at least partially linked to the deficiencies in the secular psychologies which Christians borrowed and adapted to their uses in the service of humanity.

The emergence of a new psychology is, therefore, of major importance to Christian teachers and ministers for it inevitably affects their interpretation of human relations and, above all, their practical dealings with persons in psychic distress.¹⁸

This distinction provides a bridge whereby the practical wisdom of psychotherapy can be united with the ultimate perspective of Christian thought.

Outler contends that the conditions of the alliance between psychotherapy and Christian theology in more specific terms are: (1) that psychotherapy be limited to its practical application of its insights and methodology and that Christianity preserve what is integral to its faith; namely, its theistic and transcendent view of reality; (2) that the Christian world-view is not incompatible with empirical observation or the scientific enterprise in general; (3) that the integrity of both psychotherapy and Christian thought be preserved; that is, psychotherapy whose practical wisdom is based on empirical data be judged by other empirical methodologies and that the faith claims of Christianity be challenged only by rival religious affirmations.¹⁹ Outler sums up the alliance:

In the alliance I propose between psychotherapy and Christian pastoral care, the Christian message will claim to be the measure of valid wisdom about

¹⁸Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 52-55.

the ultimate questions men ask concerning their own existence. Psychotherapy may rightly claim to be both teacher and judge and the effective means of repair and guidance of human behavior.²⁰

The criteria by which theologians and pastors can evaluate any psychology or psychotherapeutic school according to Outler are: the human self and its freedom, the human quandry, the human possibility and the ordering of life.²¹ At this point in the study we are concerned about the general purport of these issues as criteria for a general evaluation. Later in the study an attempt will be made to use these issues for a comparison between Anderson's and Niebuhr's view of pride.

The human self and freedom. One issue of central concern in both psychotherapy and theology revolves around the question of the self and its freedom. It is an issue of ultimate concern as are the other three. Psychotherapy has a basic assumption about the human self. Mainly it is implicit, but it is presupposed in the inner nature of personality. The capacities of man for wholeness and his needs to maintain this wholeness are a basic assumption of the healing process. The humanistic and naturalistic heritage of psychotherapy view the self as having no transcendent reference. This is because the self is

²⁰Ibid., p. 55.

²¹Ibid., p. 53.

understood either as a child of nature or as wholly spirit in the sense that man can control his own destiny.²² Neither view takes seriously man's essential relationship with God and thereby must be held in suspect.

The question of freedom goes hand in hand with the nature of the self in the sense that any concept of the self must be defined by its capacity for freedom or the lack of it. The Christian faith challenges the rival faith claims by its assertion that man's freedom has its roots in his self-transcendent capacity to go beyond his reason, body and his history which has its essential meaning in man's relation to the Divine. But man's freedom must be seen as one pole of man's dual nature. Man is also limited in his freedom by his finite nature. Christianity holds freedom and finiteness in tension.

The human quandary. Psychotherapy inevitably makes claims about man's predicament.²³ The fact that a psychotherapist gives an account of human disorder beyond the description of symptoms is an indication of this. Concerned men of the healing profession must account for the fact that clients do not reach their potential. The human quandary explains why this potential is not reached.

²²Ibid., p. 68.

²³Ibid., pp. 100-102.

Eric Fromm makes one of the most explicit descriptions about the human quandary from his humanistic stance.

There is only one solution to his problem: to face the truth, to acknowledge his fundamental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, to recognize that there is no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him . . . If he faces the truth without panic he will recognize that there is no meaning to life except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his power, by living productively.²⁴

This wisdom-about-life proclamation about the human situation represents what many psychotherapists operate from implicitly. The above statement proclaims that man is alone in a morally neutral reference. Thus, his quandary is more of a matter of maladjustment in a world in which he stands as his own guide and only hope. This understanding of man's problem as a deformity of the growth process cannot be supported by empirical analysis and is in direct conflict with the faith claims of Christianity.

The Christian faith sees the human quandary as sin. Man as sinner is in wrong relationship with God and others. It is God's power, love and goodness that can restore man to right relationship.

The human possibility. Psychotherapy necessarily espouses an ultimate perspective about human fulfillment.

²⁴Eric Fromm, Man For Himself (New York: Rinehart, 1947), pp. 44-45.

It is interrelated with the human predicament in that the understanding of man's quandary is an affirmation about the human possibility--of what life really is and is meant to be.

Psychotherapy assumes an implicit belief about the human possibility in the healing process by aiding a person to find new capacities for self-direction and productive interpersonal relations. Psychotherapy operates from some framework of what man can strive to be and what efforts can be taken to get there. Outler points out that not only do all schools of psychotherapy have a view of human destiny but that its content is opposed to the Gospel's perspective of human destiny.

For all their differences, we can scarcely miss the one dominant motif in all these ideas of human destiny. It is the firm conviction that all distinctively human meanings and values in life are supplied by man himself. The human possibility is man's achievement in a natural process which is essentially impersonal.²⁵

The ordering of life. Life is consciously directed toward its possibilities by man himself. To be human is to shape life after an ordered pattern. This deliberate shaping of our lives affects the quality of our existence and how we live out our destiny. Outler describes the ethical dimension of human existence in these terms.

²⁵ Outler, op. cit., p. 53.

All that is distinctively and specifically human about our lives focuses in this mystery of self-involved decision about the right and the good--the choice of ends proper to our selfhood and the choice of means appropriate to our chosen ends. Unconscious or indeliberate action is never fully human; forced or necessitated action is not quite human, either.²⁶

In spite of psychotherapy's early tendency to ignore the ethical dimension of man, most contemporary psychotherapists want to replace the old morality with a new one derived from psychotherapeutic principles. Examples of this new mood can be seen in Horney, Fromm and Sullivan who in slightly different ways are concerned with the development of a system of psychological ethics.

Horney considers the principle tasks of ethics and therapy to be the same. Essentially she says that by weakening the obstructive forces to human growth, it will allow the forces of the real self to grow.²⁷ Fromm sees therapy as being very ethical. "Analytic therapy is essentially an attempt to help the patient gain or regain his capacity for love."²⁸ Love or productive love is the best way of ordering one's life according to Fromm. Sullivan is also concerned about the ethical orientation of

²⁶ Ibid., p. 196.

²⁷ Karen Horney, Neurosis and Personal Growth (New York: Norton, 1950), pp. 347-77.

²⁸ Eric Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 87.

man. The aim of psychiatry is "reciprocal service in the evolution of ever increasing human dignity, fraternity and opportunity."²⁹

Common to all three is their rejection of moralistic attitudes. All put a positive stress upon the rational direction of life and the thrust of self towards freedom, love and self-realization. There is the basic assumption that man has the capacity to transform amoral process into authentic value.

In general the ethical wisdom of psychotherapy focuses on the confidence that human life transforms itself in the absence of crippling influences and in the presence of love and rational insight.³⁰ Humanistic pre-suppositions of psychotherapy mainly point to the ordering of life by means of self-love or which exists within man and created by man.

Every ethic is an expression of a faith of some sort and the humanistic faith on which the psychotherapy's ethic stands must be considered inadequate by Christianity. It is centered on man's faith in himself as opposed to man's faith in God as the source of human good. The Christian ethic depends upon the perspective that God is

²⁹ Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1940), p. 87.

³⁰ Outler, op. cit., p. 224.

the ground and final referent of man's ethical values just as God is the creative process in which values are known and actualized.

Counseling Within a Christian Perspective.

Pastoral Counseling is in a process of assimilating theoretical and therapeutic gains of psychotherapy. This process has been a source of stimulating questions about the identity of pastoral counseling. Three such questions come to mind: How does pastoral counseling differ from other helping professions? What is its uniqueness? What function does a pastoral counselor perform on a healing team? The ensuing passages will attempt directly or indirectly to answer these questions of identity.

It has already been established that the identity of pastoral counseling cannot be attached to content, methodology or profession, although some truth is found in each. Before all else pastoral counseling is a Christian perspective and it is on this point that this discipline stands or falls.³¹

The idea that pastoral counseling derives its identity and distinctiveness as a Christian perspective

³¹Aden, op. cit., p. 167.

draws support from the nature of counseling itself. Leroy Aden points out that counseling reflects the perspective of its counselors.

Recently I have had the opportunity to observe counselors from various helping professions as they discussed and analyzed interview material. That they did not come to the material with an unbiased concern, that they in fact perceived the client from a certain stance or point of view, was so visible that it was initially shocking and then highly instructive. One discovers what one should have known all along--that all counselors see their clients and perform their therapeutic maneuvers from various perspectives. . . . Furthermore, the counselor is unable to except the perspectives, or he may hold a particular perspective more or less flexibly.³²

The same principle in counseling, that man never perceives from a universal and unbiased position, applies to pastoral counseling. The pastor's faith is integral to pastoral counseling. He is a man of faith committed to living and interpreting a way of life. Thus it is the pastor's faith that gives pastoral counseling its primary distinctiveness.

The Christian perspective is expressed in counseling in terms of ultimate struggles in man's existence. Aden defines it in this manner:

What our thesis questions is the practice of making a psychological bias the final or basic concern of the pastoral counselor. The assertion that "pastoral counseling is a Christian perspective" implies that man's moral and spiritual struggle is its final and basic concern. Professional knowledge of this

³²Ibid., p. 173.

struggle is not the exclusive possession of pastoral counselor, but it is the focal and thus the distinctive concern of his perspective.³³

The significance of Aden's statement is that the pastor's stance of faith interprets the counseling situation in terms of his vision of the client's final struggle. Thus, pastoral counseling differs from counseling in general in that the pastor "has a different guiding image of man's plight and rescue." It is the end-point of a counselee's life-style that is the primary concern of the pastoral counselor. This means that basic problems of human existence such as alienation, finitude and guilt are treated from an ultimate perspective.

Criteria for Revised Model of "Man as Sinner."

The final chapter of this dissertation is devoted to constructing a revised model of "man as sinner" based on the comparative study of Anderson's and Niebuhr's concept of pride. The assertion here is that Niebuhr's model is inadequate. It is inadequate in that his model of sin as pride offers a phenomenological description of man's disorder only.³⁴ An etiological study of pride, such as

³³Ibid., p. 174.

³⁴Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), pp. 188, 195.

Anderson attempts, is needed for a complete model.³⁵ The way in which this is to be done is through combining Niebuhr's theological model with Anderson's psychodynamic one. As pointed out earlier, this integration must preserve the integrity of the gospel of the Christian faith and to do justice to the methodology of psychotherapy. It is a process through which the truth of the gospel is applied to the needs of man.

III. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

It is not the task of this dissertation to give a thorough and exhaustive study on the nature and meaning of pride. If this were so, then a study of pride from Old and New Testament, church history, ancient and modern literature and modern psychotherapeutic schools would be necessary. Rather, the purpose of this dissertation is to find a meaningful model for pastoral counseling through a comparative study of pride. Thus, the concentration of this paper is as much upon the methodology of constructing a model for pastoral counseling as it is upon the study of the nature and meaning of pride itself.

³⁵Fred Berthold, Jr., "Theology and Self-Understanding: The Christian Model of Man as Sinner," in Homans, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

Certain problems which had arisen within the investigation of pride but which could not be treated properly or not at all are: (1) the relation of pride to sensuality in regard to Niebuhr's analysis; (2) the relation of pride to Niebuhr's Christological understanding; (3) Anderson's view of pride in relation to religion; and (4) Anderson's application of her theory of pride to the counseling situation.

CHAPTER II

CAMILLA ANDERSON: A PSYCHODYNAMIC VIEW OF PRIDE

Pride and grandiosity. Grandiosity is Anderson's term for pride. It is used not only to describe grandiose assumptions but also the dynamic source of human personality. Grandiosity is a universal principle which operates in human behavior everywhere despite cultural, social and individual differences. It is grounded in the basic life-force: the will-to-live.¹ In psychological perspective grandiosity is the process by which a person preserves his idealized self-image. Theologically, it is the self's attempt to justify its existence. This is a necessary process for Anderson because one's self-image cannot be separated from one's self-perception; that is, the self intrinsically is identified with its perceptions. To dissociate the self from what it perceives is equal to self-extinction. Anderson describes this process in this manner:

For the human being, it seems essential that he maintain his prideful self image intact. He equates preserving and enhancing his vanity or his grandiosity with self-preservation because his psyche, or

¹Camilla M. Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy" (Frontera: California Institution for Women, 1966), p. 3.

psychological self, and his pride system are identical. Thus, in the psychological realm, as in the physical, self-preservation is basic.²

Another source of grandiosity is a biological one of the long human dependency period.³ Since a child requires attention and care for a great length of time, it is natural for him to think that the world centers around his existence. This stems from the fact that his family centers their concern and attention on him because of his dependency state. Therefore, it is quite nature for the child to assume that he is special or better than others.

This feeling of being special, which has its roots in survival and in the biological fact of human dependency, is interrelated with the formation of self-image.

As the child develops, the belief in his specialness tends to be reinforced, either through identification with the people who minister to him (and whom we call the primary significant people) who regard themselves as special, or through development of various traits which are deemed worthy by these same significant people or their surrogates. It is through the interaction of the child's potentials and the demands (expressed in values) of the significant persons that traits develop, and each and every trait is accounted as right or wrong.⁴

²Ibid.

³Camilla M. Anderson, "The Pot and the Kettle," Journal of American Medical Women's Association, XVIII:4 (April 1963), 6.

⁴Ibid.

Grandiosity, thus, is not only a universal principle operating in all behavior but it is a process of acquiring values, beliefs and assumptions in order to justify the existence of the self. Assumptions which make up the value system are acquired from significant persons. It is out of this relationship that the child learns what assumptions are safe to have and those which are dangerous since assumptions are identical with one's self-perceptions. Thus, assumptions are directly linked to survival needs of a person.

Not only is grandiosity the basis of Anderson's theory of personality but it is her term for assumptions which manifest prideful behavior. Grandiose assumptions give rise to grandiose behavior. An assumption which is grandiose expresses an attitude of superiority, smugness or egoism to name a few. These prideful expressions are for the most part repressed because society cannot tolerate the obvious overbearing manifestation of grandiosity. It is necessary for grandiose assumptions to disguise themselves.

Many of you will automatically picture grandiosity as a trait that is easily spotted--with its insufferable strutting about and throwing its weight around. If this were true it would be simple. The fact is that grandiosity masquerades in all manner of disguises. Most commonly it parades in humility, modesty, self derogation, timidity, self effacement, insensitivity, in fear of trying, in wanting to be no better than--but just as good as, in wailing over inadequacies. Or it may present itself in self pity,

in contempt, in smug quietness or in smug arrogance, in the role of the perpetual giver or do-gooder, in the one who is or always must be in the right, the perfectionist in a thousand and one ways. Usually the grandiose one has no slightest idea that he is grandiose.⁵

Thus, the characteristics of grandiose assumptions are on the one hand secret because they are largely unconscious and on the other they are disguised feelings. Deception is possible because feelings are derived from assumptions rather than being two distinct entities.⁶ Since obvious grandiose behavior stemming from grandiose assumptions are not accepted, then acceptable feelings can hide those disapproved assumptions. This usually takes place without the individual knowing about it.

Grandiosity as Anderson understands it is a fact of existence which has both positive and negative aspects to it. On the one hand grandiosity is connected with the survival instinct. It functions to protect the psychological self against the threat of anxiety. This performs the necessary task of establishing order out of chaos. Interrelated with this is the positive function of grandiosity in affirming the self as good and worthwhile. Implicit in the need for survival is the basic assumption

⁵Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁶Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy," p. 6.

that "I am worth living." Grandiosity, then, has a basic thrust toward self-affirming behavior.

In the negative sense grandiosity is the basis of human distortion of reality. The assumptions derived from the early formative years of a child are shaped by the self's need to maintain its good self image. However, these grandiose assumptions developed for security reasons during the early years of formation often become rigid and unchanged. In later years these unconscious assumptions do not fit the reality of everyday experience. As a result an individual will cling to these assumptions designed to preserve one's good self-picture rather than adapting to facts of reality. This causes the individual to devote a great amount of energy to maintaining his pride system. The consequence is broken relationship and distorted communication. Anderson puts it in these terms:

The second of the great causes of behavioral or psychiatric disturbance is the fact of having an unrealistic or false self image. The particular nature of this false self image or self concept can be described in a single word: grandiosity. I would like to make the clear, simple and unequivocal statement that grandiosity is the cause of functional or non organic mental illness. I would also like to state that in a great many instances--perhaps even the majority labeled cases--it is not a matter of either-or, but rather both-and, in which the two factors, the organic and the psychodynamic, are both present. Each

contributes its characteristic vulnerability to stress, and helps determine the pattern of the pathologic symptoms.⁷

Pride and personality. For Anderson the basic thrust of personality is towards maintaining its value system since it is by this means that the self can keep its good self image intact.

Universal primary grandiosity, or, as Freud called it, primary narcissism, is grandually reinforced through a secondary process, the incorporation or development of a value system which is made up of "right beliefs." Having right beliefs is also a universal, and each person regards himself as properly better than others by reason of embodying these correct beliefs. Nobody holds a wrong belief; the moment he suspects a belief to be wrong, he drops it. Having right beliefs is a more potent source of self-esteem than is an action which is carried out, i.e., "I may eat peas with my knife, but at least I am superior to (better than) the poor misguided person who doesn't know that peas should not be eaten with a knife!" Everyone, without exception, finds a basis for believing or assuming he is superior or special.⁸

Besides the fact that assumptions constitute the basis of the value system in the human personality, they are also the material which make up a person's self image. Every individual identifies himself with his assumptions; that is, the self is the sum total of its assumptions which are the means by which the self perceives itself

⁷ Anderson, "The Pot and the Kettle," pp. 5-6.

⁸ Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy," p. 4.

and the world.⁹ Anderson interprets the significance of assumptions as the essence of the self for the life-situation.

Each individual identifies himself with his beliefs or assumptions, which are regarded as self-evident truths. He is the person who believes women should manage the money; or that men ought not to do any housework; or that children should obey without question; or that one must always tell the truth; or that girls should have first choice. Each person's life, his actions and his feelings, is made up of the patterning resulting from the hundreds of thousands of beliefs which he has acquired. Each belief about behavior is tagged with a value of more or less right or wrong, so that there is a gradation or hierarchy from "must" through "may" to "must not." No value is assigned arbitrarily, but derives from one's experience of having lived in the particular interpersonal world which was one's lot.¹⁰

In terms of Anderson's personality theory, assumptions are the consistent determinates of human behavior. They constitute both the pride system and the self image. The question that arises is how assumptions are formed and what are their characteristics.

At birth an infant has no assumptions. They are formed and shaped from interpersonal relationships.¹¹ The infant is born with a physical self which consists of a bundle of physical reflexes. These reflexes are geared

⁹Camilla M. Anderson, Beyond Freud (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 75.

¹⁰Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy," p. 4.

¹¹Anderson, Beyond Freud, p. 19.

toward survival. Out of the infant's interaction with significant persons come the assumptions which make up the psychological self. These assumptions are formed according to the tension states and values of significant others.

Every belief or assumption about behavior concerns interpersonal behavior or interaction, and derives its assigned value of right or wrong from the relative degree of security or insecurity having accrued to the individual as a dependent person through holding such a belief in his particular interpersonal world.
. . .

The value system (assumptions concerning right and wrong) of the significant people (parents, teachers and other surrogates) determines the attitudes, reactions and pressures or lack of pressures which these people exert on the child. These are the culture-making and culture-binding influences. The assumptions of authorities will produce the sense of interpersonal security or danger which the child experiences. This in turn will determine the values assigned by the child to the behavior and the underlying assumptions which he develops as he gradually and unconsciously sorts, organizes and classifies his experiences. Going contrary to the values of his significant persons has some level of danger which he learns by experience; behaving harmoniously with their value system results in security.¹²

According to Anderson, right and wrong beliefs are not only related to the experience of tension states of significant persons, but also to roles which can be systematized.

¹²Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy,"
p. 6.

Since whatever attitudes (moral value judgments) one has are directed toward people and people are invariably identified with roles, we can approach a classification of assumptions through a schema of role identification. For every role there will be acceptable and nonacceptable actions and reactions, depending on one's conceived sources of survival--the supernatural; the natural, self evident, or understandable; oneself; other people; and institutions.¹³

She says "what I believe is what I am" determines both what I do in any conceived role and how I feel about what I do and feel about what other people do to me.

The underlying thought here is that the character of assumptions are two-fold.¹⁴ Since assumptions develop out of an interpersonal setting, each one necessarily has two parts. The first part is what action a person takes in any role and the second is the response to what someone else has done. This is what Anderson calls the actor-reactor concept.

We may say that every psychological assumption includes the actor-reactor concept.

Action-Reaction Concept. Because the basis of the two-pronged assumption usually is not in awareness, the habitual practice is for the person, A, to take for granted (assume) not only that he is doing what is right or what is justified, but that the other person, B, the reactor, is supposed to behave in response as A's assumptions or value system has predetermined that he should. The person's assumptions-concerning-responses are expressed through the felt entitlements which he holds. This makes

¹³Anderson, Beyond Freud, p. 87.

¹⁴Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy," p. 6.

difficulties because the reactor also has a system of values, assumptions and attitudinal sets regarding interpersonal behavior based on his own past experience. These may not coincide with the anticipations or felt entitlements of the one to whom he is reacting. An additional difficulty arises because in any interaction the roles of actor and reactor are continually shifting. A person may conceive of himself as the actor at one moment and the reactor at the next moment.¹⁵

Thus, right and wrong assumptions are directly related to roles and role playing. In the process of every day life, a child learns that some behavior is acceptable in one role but not acceptable in another. For example, an adult may hit a child, but a child may not hit him back. By the time a child reaches adolescence he has mostly completed a "complement of conceived values" for all conceived roles.¹⁶

The pride system made up of basic assumptions is the core of human personality. It functions so that every person has the best value system. Anderson points out this dynamic.

Since I have the very best of value systems, and since my beliefs about right and wrong behavior are fairly definite and clear cut--essentially the ultimate--it is not strange that I regard myself so highly, and that I can feel so smugly contemptuous of those who don't have a value system as good as mine.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Anderson, "The Pot and the Kettle," p. 8.

It may even be that I can violate my code in some unimportant respect and still feel smugly superior because at least I know what is right.¹⁷

Pride and mental health. Up to this point, we have described the process of the dynamic principle of grandiosity as the shaping of assumptions--the consistent elements of the self. Now we shall delve into the nature of grandiose assumptions which are the cause of major disturbances within and without the self. As already indicated, assumptions are influenced by the dynamic principle of grandiosity but assumptions may or may not be grandiose. Moreover, grandiose assumptions vary in intensity and importance. Grandiose assumptions which are particularly destructive are those who exaggerate one's specialness beyond all proportion. In this case they are false assumptions about oneself, others and the world. Its basic characteristic is a pretense of being something or someone who one is not.¹⁸

Stress feelings which accompany mental illness are the result of exaggerated grandiose assumptions.¹⁹ They

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Camilla M. Anderson, "Depression and Suicide Reassessed," Journal of American Medical Women's Association, XIX:6 (June 1964), 1.

¹⁹ Camilla M. Anderson, Saints, Sinners and Psychiatry (Portland: Durham Press, 1950), p. 24.

signal a breakdown of the self's defense system which is designed to protect the self's ideal image. Stress feelings are experienced when the self is threatened and anxiety breaks in. The three basic symptoms of stress feelings are: guilt, resentment and helplessness.²⁰

Guilt can be healthy or neurotic. Normal guilt is short-lived whereas neurotic guilt is a persistent feeling of blaming oneself. Neurotic guilt stems from grandiose assumptions. The underlying dynamic is the violation of one's standards. These standards are unrealistic projections of perfection which are quite impossible to live up to. Guilt from grandiosity concentrates on the past and acts as a diversionary tactic with regard to the present which would produce more anxiety. Thus, guilt focuses on the inner value system of a person who experiences anxiety because his false perfectionistic norm is transgressed.

Resentment is an experience of anxiety resulting from frustrated entitlement.²¹ In this case one's sense of perfection is broken by the other rather than oneself as in guilt. Its assumption is: "I special did not get from you what I expected to receive." The other person

²⁰Camilla M. Anderson, "Guilt is not the Problem," Pastoral Counselor, II:1 (Fall, 1964), 6.

²¹Ibid.

"ought to" is the compulsive feeling of resentment in reverse to "I ought" of guilt.

Helplessness is the anxiety of not being able to live up to one's good self image. Helplessness is different from guilt in that a person gives up trying to be what he expects of himself whereas guilt does something against what he feels he must be. The reference for helplessness may be either the actor or the reactor rather than restricted to one or the other as in guilt and resentment.²²

²²Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy," p. 9.

CHAPTER III

REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGICAL VIEW OF PRIDE

Pride and sin. Niebuhr's understanding of pride always lies within the context of the Christian meaning of sin. He justifies his claim of pride as sin from several sources. First of all there is biblical justification. From the Old Testament Niebuhr uses the Fall story as a basic text for understanding sin as pride.¹ In the New Testament he draws on a Pauline interpretation.

We have previously considered the Biblical definition of basic sin as pride and have suggested that the Pauline exposition of man's self-glorification ("they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like unto corruptible man") is really an admirable summary of the whole Biblical doctrine of sin.²

Secondly, Niebuhr contends that a substantial history of Christian thought has interpreted basic sin to be pride. It is known as Augustinian theology.³ Luther, Calvin and Pascal follow this line of development.

In analyzing the relationship of pride to sin in respect to Niebuhr's understanding there is a problem as to whether pride is the essence of sin or derivative of it. In one brief passage Niebuhr deals with this problem.

¹Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), I, 179-180.

²Ibid., I, 186.

³Ibid., I, 186-87.

The ideal possibility is that faith in the ultimate security of God's love overcomes all immediate insecurities of nature and history. That is why Christian orthodoxy has consistently defined unbelief as the root of sin, or the sin which precedes pride.⁴

This significant statement indicates that pride is the result of unbelief rather than vice-versa. The conclusion must be made that unbelief is basic sin and pride is the fruit of sin. This distinction means that pride and unbelief are not identical. Unbelief is a lack of faith in God's love which is occasioned by anxiety from the tension of man's two-fold nature. Pride is the abuse of man's essential freedom and results in pretense and selfishness. However, Niebuhr does not hesitate to describe pride as basic sin.⁵ The reason being that, because of the in-built tension in man, pride is the inevitable consequence of not trusting in God.

Niebuhr approaches sin of pride from a dialectical stance. Pride is viewed from a position of faith and revelation. This is the "religious dimension" of sin. It is the broken relationship between man and God in which man attempts to become God-like. Pride seen from the pole of human experience is called "the moral dimension of sin." This is a phenomenological description of

⁴Ibid., I, 183.

⁵Ibid., I, 186.

pride between man and man. Niebuhr sums up the matter in this manner:

The Bible defines sin in both religious and moral terms. The religious dimension of sin is man's rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God. The moral and social dimension of sin is injustice. The ego which falsely makes itself the centre of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably subordinates other life to its will and thus does injustice to other life.⁶

Although religious and moral pride are not identical, they are opposite sides of the same coin. Both interact with each other on all levels of human existence. The religious dimension of pride is characterized by disorder caused by man's refusal to follow God's destiny for man. The moral dimension of pride is the consequence of man's alienation from God. It is a history of dehumanization and inhumanity.

Sin of pride manifests itself in human history in the form of pride of power, pride of learning, pride of goodness and pride of theology.⁷ Pride of power reveals itself in human behavior in two forms. In the first case man desires power in order to become self-sufficient and to secure himself from all vicissitudes. In this instance man does not recognize the contingent character of his existence. He pretends to be the author of his own destiny and the judge of his values.

⁶Ibid., I, 179.

⁷Ibid., I, 188.

The other form of pride of power is a lust for power which has pride as its end.⁸ It is an indication that man does not feel secure and therefore tends to grasp for more power to overcome his insecurity. Persons lusting for power do not regard themselves as sufficiently important. Their impotency compels them to enhance their position in society. Individuals seeking this kind of power want it and keep it at the expense of other persons. Besides using others, lust for power often manifests itself by conquest of nature. Here individuals use nature as a means to gain their ends.

Pride of learning is closely related to pride of power; particularly, in its more obvious manifestations of will-to-power because knowledge goes hand in hand with desire for power and position. Niebuhr says that intellectual pride is not to be limited to either political interests or to intellectuals.

All human knowledge is tainted with an "ideological" taint. It pretends to be more true than it is. It is finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final and ultimate knowledge.⁹

Philosophy and philosophers in particular have failed to realize their "ideological" taint. In obtaining a clear perspective of the past to be skilled enough to point out

⁸Ibid., I, 189.

⁹Ibid., I, 194.

previous philosophical errors they fail to see their own ignorance. They forget that they operate out of a certain perspective of time and history which will in time become itself obsolete. However, intellectual pride ought not to be limited to "ignorance of ignorance." There is connected to it an effort of pretention.¹⁰ At some level of intellectual pride man tries to obscure a known self-interest. There is always some awareness that the truth is not somehow final and a realization that self-interest is somehow related to this truth.

Pride of learning is a fusion of both human freedom and human insecurity. They are the sources of human behavior which direct men to deceive themselves behind the cloak of intellectualism. Niebuhr writes:

If man were not a free spirit who transcends every situation in which he is involved he would have no concern for unconditioned truth and he would not be tempted to claim absolute validity of his partial perspectives. If he were completely immersed in the contingencies and necessities of nature he would have only his own truth and would not be tempted to confuse his truth with the truth. But in that case he would have no truth at all, for no particular event or value could be related meaningfully to the whole. If on the other hand man were wholly transcendent he would not be tempted to insinuate the necessities of the moment and the vagaries of the hour into the truth and thus corrupt it. Nor would he be prompted to deny the finiteness of his knowledge in order to escape the despair of scepticism which threatens him upon the admission of such ignorance.¹¹

¹⁰Ibid., I, 196.

¹¹Ibid., I, 197-98.

Pride of goodness is found in all spheres of intellectual pride. It disguises itself under the pretension of possessing the ultimate truth. Underneath all this is an assertion of establishing "my good" as the primary criteria of moral value. Niebuhr points out the precise interrelatedness of moral pride to intellectual pride.

Moral pride is revealed in all "self-righteous" judgments in which the other is condemned because he fails to conform to the highly arbitrary standards of the self. Since the self judges itself by its own standards it finds itself good. It judges others by its own standards and finds them evil, when their standards fail to conform to its own.¹²

One's own truth disguised as universal truth is used to judge others. This is the basis of self-righteousness. In religious terms the self substitutes its values for divine values and thus is able to attach sin to outsiders.

The danger of pride of learning is that it makes virtue into a vehicle of sin. This is the essence of Jesus' struggle with the Pharisees. Niebuhr thinks that this is also the primary issue behind the Protestant Reformation's principle of grace versus works.

Luther rightly insisted that the unwillingness of the sinner to be regarded as a sinner was the final form of sin. The final proof that man no longer knows God is that he does not know his own sin. The sinner who justifies himself does not know God as judge and does not need God as Saviour. One might

¹²Ibid., I, 199.

add that the sin of self-righteousness is not only the final sin in the subjective sense but also in the objective sense. It involves us in the greatest guilt. It is responsible for our most serious cruelties, injustices and defamations against our fellow-men.¹³

Pride of theology has its roots in moral pride.

Niebuhr questions as to whether pride of theology or spiritual pride should be classified in a category by itself or not. "The third type, the pride of self-righteousness, rises to a form of spiritual pride, which is at once a fourth type and yet not a specific form of pride at all but pride and self-glorification in its inclusive and quintessential form."¹⁴ Spiritual pride is the peak of the other forms of pride which ascends in sequence. It culminates in self-deification. The more unmistakably pride appears in its own form and exhibits its true aim, the more clearly it shows itself to be the willful destruction of man's original position before God.¹⁵

Spiritual pride presents the greatest danger to religion because it controls man in the name of God. Revealed religion such as Christianity has inner checks to prevent man from using God for his own ends. Niebuhr writes:

¹³ Ibid., I, 200.

¹⁴ Ibid., I, 188.

¹⁵ Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), p. 189.

Christianity rightly regards itself as a religion, not so much of man's search for God, in the process of which he may make himself God; but as a religion of revelation in which a holy and loving God is revealed to man as the source and end of all finite existence against whom the self-will of man is shattered and his pride abased.¹⁶

The four manifestations of pride in human behavior as analyzed by Niebuhr have a common characteristic that needs to be more fully explored; namely, deceit. Pride by nature seeks to hide itself and to deceive others. It uses tactics of confusing by concealment such as avoiding clear decisions. Deceit provides man the necessary fronts to hide himself from God and his fellow man. It allows the human ego to view such self-concealment as if it is not an evil thing. Niebuhr explains the dynamics of deceit in superb fashion.

Our analysis of man's sin of pride and self-love has consistently assumed that an element of deceit is involved in this self-glorification. This dishonesty must be regarded as a concomitant, and not as the basis, of self-love. Man loves himself inordinately. Since his determinate existence does not deserve the devotion lavished upon it, it is obviously necessary to practice some deception in order to justify such excessive devotion. While such deception is constantly directed against competing will, seeking to secure their acceptance and validation of the self's too generous opinion of itself, its primary purpose is to deceive, not others, but the self. The self must at any rate deceive itself first. Its deception of others is partly an effort to convince itself against itself. The fact that this necessity exists is an important indication of the vestige of truth which abides with the self in all its confusion and

¹⁶Niebuhr, op. cit., I, 201.

which it must placate before it can act. The dishonesty of man is thus an interesting refutation of the doctrine of man's total depravity.¹⁷

The result of the self's deceiving itself leads only to further insecurity. The cycle is a vicious one in which pride attempts to control its destiny only to find itself in greater depths of insecurity.

Another characteristic that intersects and affects the four manifestations of pride is collective or group pride. There is a basic distinction between group pride and individual pride. Group pride takes its source from individual attitudes yet has an authority over the individual which individual pride does not have.¹⁸ In collective pride unconditioned demands are often made by the group upon the individual. In this instance group values take precedence over individual values. This is seen for example in the demands of the state over the rights of the individual.

Collective pride is different from individual pride on another level. The collective self says Niebuhr exceeds the individual self. Therefore the group ego is more self-interest oriented and ruthless in achieving its goals than is the individual ego.¹⁹ This inevitably leads to a moral tension between the two. An example of this

¹⁷ Ibid., I, 203.

¹⁸ Ibid., I, 208.

¹⁹ Ibid., I, 209.

tension is apparent in the conscience of responsible statesmen who feel the disparity between morality of the people and the accepted habits of collective and political behavior.

Pride and self. The last section was spent in exploring Niebuhr's understanding of sin of pride both from the pole of faith and from the pole of experience. The task of this section is to examine the relationship of pride to the doctrine of man. Niebuhr's doctrine of man is the key to understanding his whole theology and particularly the underlying dynamics of pride. William John Wolf states the importance of Niebuhr's doctrine of man for Niebuhr's theology.

Articulated in terms of man's relations with his fellow men, the doctrine of man is determinative for his social ethics and his interpretation of the meaningfulness of history. Concentrated in terms of personality, and brought into correlation with the historic Christian revelation, it defines his understanding of Christology, atonement, and eschatology.²⁰

For Niebuhr man is both a creature of spirit and a creature of nature. To understand man from strictly one pole or the other leads one to either a rational view of the self or a romantic one. Man, then, exists in tension

²⁰ William John Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.) Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 230.

as both finite and free. As a creature of nature, man is limited, dependent and involved in the contingencies of the natural world.

As a creature of spirit, man has the capacity to transcend himself and the world. Niebuhr expresses the height of self-transcendence in man's spiritual status in the doctrine of the "Image of God."²¹ The uniqueness of man lies in his radical freedom to transcend himself and his situation. Therein lies the source of man to choose good or evil. Man chooses to center existence around himself rather than continuing God's design in the world. In this act man absolutized the spirit-side of the self over against the creature-side of the self.

The essential self is the proper balance or unity between freedom and finiteness. This existed before the fall. This original state of man Niebuhr calls Justitia Originalis.²² This provides a contrast between what man ought to be and what man is and finds its expression in the conflict between conscience and will.²³ Pride is the result of imbalance or split in the personality. This causes continual anxiety because the self possesses an awareness of its basic unity.

²¹Niebuhr, op. cit., I, 150-66.

²²Ibid., I, 265-300.

²³Ibid., I, 266.

In another sense, the source of pride is not in what man is but what he wishes to be. Niebuhr clarifies this from a biblical standpoint.

It is not the contradiction of finiteness and freedom from which Biblical religion seeks emancipation. It seeks redemption from sin; and the sin from which it seeks redemption is occasioned, though not caused, by this contradiction because, according to Biblical faith, there is no absolute necessity that man should be betrayed into sin by the ambiguity of his position, as standing in and yet above nature. But it cannot be denied that this is the occasion for his sin.

Man is insecure and involved in the natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness. Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he pretends that he is not limited. He assumes that he can gradually transcend finite limitations until his mind becomes identical with universal mind. All of his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of pride. Man's pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation.²⁴

Thus, man wishing to be infinite, limitless and all-powerful pretends to be more than he is. Moreover, the self must continually deceive itself in believing this.

There are three basic factors which are the source of sin of pride: man's paradoxical nature, the moment of temptation and basic anxiety. One source of the sin of pride is man's intrinsic self-contradiction. He is tied on the one hand to nature and his place within the historical process. Yet on the other hand man has the

²⁴Ibid., I, 178-79.

capacity to survey the past and project into the future. Despite his frailty, limitedness and contingency, man is free to reject his relatedness with God in and for which he was created. This self-contradiction within man inevitably produces basic anxiety.

A rejection of God by a force or power was already made. Niebuhr calls this in mythological terms "the devil."²⁵ The significance of this is that man is presented a desirable possibility of becoming like God. This is the moment of temptation. God is not responsible for this decision on the part of man to become God-like. Although man is responsible for his decision, yet he is tempted by a force beyond himself.

The third underlying factor of sin of pride is anxiety resulting from both man's self-contradiction and temptation. When man has once rejected his relatedness to God, and so loses the shelter of God's support and becomes conscious of his uncertainty and lack of protection; he is misled by his greed for security into unlimited anxiety for his own existence.

In short, man, being both free and bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved. Anxiety is the internal precondition of sin. It is the inevitable

²⁵Ibid., 180-81.

spiritual state of man, standing in the paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness. Anxiety is the internal description of the state of temptation.²⁶

Behind man's voluntary decision to assert himself overagainst God, is the unspoken question of the relation of sin of pride to human responsibility. Niebuhr handles this through his concept of temptation. He is able to assert that man sins inevitably but is still responsible.²⁷ The anxiety arising from man's freedom is both the source of man's temptation and his creativity. Man's situation tempts the self to center upon itself; yet, this anxiety affords man the ideal possibility of trusting in God's love. Man's being responsible for his sin is due to the fact that basic sin is unbelief.

The sin of the inordinate self-love thus points to the prior sin of lack of trust in God. The anxiety of unbelief is not merely the fear which comes from ignorance of God. "Anxiety," declares Kierkegaard, "is the dizziness of freedom," but it is significant that the same freedom which tempts to anxiety also contains the ideal possibility of knowing God. Here the Pauline psychology is penetrating and significant. St. Paul declares that man is without excuse because "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead" (Romans 1:20). The anxiety of freedom leads to sin only if the prior sin of unbelief is assumed. This is the meaning of Kierkegaard's assertion that sin posits itself.²⁸

²⁶Ibid., I, 182.

²⁷Ibid., I, 251.

²⁸Ibid., I, 252.

In attempting to explain why man is so unduly concerned about himself Niebuhr is led into an analysis of original sin. More precisely original sin is his explanation of what is the original cause of sin. The answer is that "sin posits itself." This means that there can be no general explanation of sin in itself. It can be comprehended by no philosophic interest in its origin. Whatever theories of sin and its origin may be formulated, sin's true nature remains the concern of man in faith.

Hans Hoffmann says:

Like Kierkegaard, he [Niebuhr] does not believe that it is possible to set forth the etiology of sin. Sin posits itself. This being the case, one can only trace the phenomenology of sin in human behavior and point to its consequences.²⁹

Pride and faith. Up to this point the thrust has been on the analysis of sin of pride in terms of its dynamics and phenomenology. This section turns our attention to sin of pride in regard to man's restoration. The central question here is: Since the original order of God's design is broken, how is order to be restored and man rescued from his pride? The answer requires an understanding of Niebuhr's meaning of faith, Christology and grace.

²⁹Hans Hofmann, "Reinhold Niebuhr," in Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (eds.) A Handbook of Christian Theologians (New York: World, 1965), p. 367.

In general, faith is understood by Niebuhr as a leap of faith quite similar to Kierkegaard.³⁰ The gap between man and God dug by sin can only be traversed by God's initiative. Hence, revelation is necessary for man's restoration. Man's response in this process of restoration is to have a contrite heart; that is, a spirit of repentance and confession.

The event of Jesus Christ is God's redeeming act in history. It is a unique act which bridges the distance between man and God. Since the place of the breakdown is in the arena of history and nature, man must renew his relation to nature and history corresponding to man's dual nature of finitude and freedom. In Jesus Christ man in nature and man in history meet. It is in this context that Christ is revealed as the wisdom of God and the power of God.

The Christian gospel nevertheless enters the world with the proclamation that in Christ both "wisdom" and "power" are available to man which is to say that not only has the true meaning of life been disclosed but also that resources have been made available to fulfill meaning. . . . The two emphases are contained in the double connotation of the word "grace" in the New Testament. Grace represents on the one hand the power of God over man. Grace is on the other hand

³⁰ Richard Kroner, "The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought," in Kegley, op. cit., p. 184.

the power of God in man; it represents an accession of resources, which man does not have of himself,³¹ enabling him to become what he truly ought to be.

Grace, thus, has a two dimensional understanding. On the one hand, it is a forgiveness in which repentance of one's prideful self brings new resources of self-fulfillment. On the other hand grace is a power which needs on every level forgiveness for the pride claims that the self is bound to make. In Niebuhr's exegesis of Galatians 2:20 these two dimensions of grace are correlated with man's contradiction of his essential nature in light of the Cross. "I am crucified with Christ." Here Niebuhr focuses upon the death of the self's attempt to center existence around itself. The self is shattered by its confrontation by God.³²

"Nevertheless I live." The death of the prideful self leads to a rebirth of the essential or real self which has its true center in Jesus Christ.³³

"Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." This is the self's expression of gratitude. It is the self's wish to attribute to Christ the whole work of redemption. The significance is that the self is justified by the divine acceptance of its intentions rather by its achievements.³⁴

³¹Niebuhr, op. cit., II, 98-99.

³²Ibid., II, 109.

³³Ibid., II, 112.

³⁴Ibid., II, 114-266.

Niebuhr compares and contrasts the two main theological interpretations of grace, the Catholic idea of grace in nobis (in us) and the Protestant idea of grace pro nobis (for us).³⁵ He proposes a synthesis of these two viewpoints in which man's life in the course of history will be seen to stand before ever new possibilities of both good and evil.

A new synthesis is therefore called for. It must be a synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of Biblical religion, and adds the light which modern history, and the Renaissance and Reformation interpretations of history, have thrown upon the paradox of grace. Briefly this means that on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social or political problem in which men do not face new possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means on the other hand that every effort and pretension to complete life, whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to stand beyond the contradictions of history, or to eliminate the final corruptions of history must be disavowed.

Because both Renaissance and Reformation have sharpened the insights into the meaning of the two sides of the Christian paradox, it is not possible to return to the old, that is, to the medieval synthesis, though we may be sure that efforts to do so will undoubtedly be abundant.³⁶

The resultant synthesis is developed under the idea of tolerance in Chapter eight of Vol. II, Nature and Destiny of Man in "Having and Not Having the Truth."

³⁵ Ibid., II, 227-48.

³⁶ Ibid., II, 207.

Niebuhr explores the paradoxical problem of holding a truth in genuine conviction yet without the arrogant finality or absoluteness which generates intolerance. The test of tolerance comes not in ideas to which there is no real attachment, but rather in those ideas which are believed with conviction. Man has truth but not final truth. Absolute truth must be affirmed as an aspect of God rather than as a human achievement.³⁷

³⁷Ibid., II, 213-31.

CHAPTER IV

DIALOGUE ON BASIC ISSUES

Given the fact that a particular theological and psychological analysis of pride has been presented, the task of this chapter is to apply the methodology developed in chapter one; specifically, to separate the ultimate perspectives of Anderson's pride-concept from the practical wisdom which her psychotherapy offers in the healing of persons. By this process of separation of faith claims from clinical application it is possible to complement Niebuhr's Christian view of man. That is to say, Niebuhr's claim that pride is a manifestation of disharmony of the self's dual nature needs to be united with Anderson's insight that pride is the cause of distorted perception of oneself and the universe.

A general observation about the relationship between these two studies is necessary before evaluating Anderson on the ultimate categories of self, freedom, sin, salvation and ethics.

Niebuhr's view of pride is based on ultimate concern or faith claims. It centers on man's beginning, man's present state of existence and man's final end. The totality of man's life is encompassed and put into perspective through Divine will for man.

Anderson's theory of pride is concerned with a partial view of man. Her study of pride focuses on the psychological and psychodynamic facts of man's existence. The goal of her psychotherapy is to heal persons so that they may function effectively in society, and preferably with some creativity.

It is presupposed that a theological view of pride must necessarily deal with such ultimate issues as the nature of self, freedom, the human predicament, salvation and right behavior because it is an articulated expression of faith seeking understanding of final ends. However, it is less generally recognized that such disciplines as psychology, economics, sociology or biology purport to say something about the end-goals of man. The faith-claims of such disciplines are mainly disguised in clinical garb and thus are not easily discernable. In many ways Anderson's assumption-centered psychotherapy is a good representative of this. There are many unexamined assumptions which express final claims about man's existence. In general, Anderson's position comes out of a naturalistic and humanistic background. The self and its freedom are viewed within the framework of man's finitude. Yet on the other hand man's values are fashioned by the unbounded human spirit making itself a home in the universe. This is to say, Niebuhr's primary assertion that

man's essential nature exists in tension between both freedom and finiteness is divided and separated by Anderson.

The self and freedom. In Niebuhr's perspective the question of the self and its freedom lies in man's dual nature. Christian faith embraces the self-contradiction and lives within the tension. The self exists in dialogue with itself, man and God. The essence of the Christian faith-claim is that the self is discovered, shaped and fulfilled in reference to God.

Anderson has left this issue of the self and its freedom to be settled by negative implication rather than by direct statements. This is basically true of all the other issues. Anderson affirms that man is foremost a social being shaped by his interpersonal environment. Her study on the formation of assumptions and their function are a significant contribution to understanding personality. She hypothesizes that assumptions form the structure of the self and are the key to understanding values and beliefs. However, there is no indication that the self has any relationship to God. God certainly acts through human relationships, but Anderson does not seem to imply this. Her main thrust is to see the self as dependent upon, and relative to, what its environment is. She sees the self as limited by the process of nature and

environment. The self does not have the capacity to transcend itself; it is subject only since the self is identical with its perceptions.

The freedom of the self is directly related to how one views the nature of the self. Niebuhr defines the uniqueness of man in terms of his freedom. His uniqueness in his capacity to choose his destiny through his power to transcend his finite existence.

For Anderson freedom is restricted within the boundaries of perception. The formation of the self is dependent upon its perceptions and perceptions as we know are imperfect because they are taken from others during childhood. Since perceptions are dependent upon one's cultural milieu, a person's freedom is relative to his environment. Thus, freedom is not inherent to the self but rather a product of the self's perceptive powers.

The human quandary. Niebuhr like Anderson has his deepest insights about man's plight. Sin is the consequence of faithlessness. The original blessing of God is rejected out of anxiety. The manifestation of this anxiety is man's attempt to overcome it by pretending to deny one's finiteness and using one's freedom to gain power over other human beings and nature. Pride distorts man's total perception of his existence--the self becomes the center of the universe rather than God.

Anderson describes and explains the phenomena of egoism, labeling it the basis of mental illness. Her description of the way in which the self justifies and protects itself through disguise, deception and dishonesty describes the same phenomena that Niebuhr's theological analysis of self-deception describes.

The wisdom about human sin is one thing but the claim that sin has its origin in human distortion without any reference to human-divine relationship is another thing. Anderson says that the self is the sum total of its assumptions. This makes the self passive since it is identified with its assumptions which are derived from its interpersonal environment. Thus, the self has no power to transcend its grandiose assumptions because the self is its grandiose assumptions. Therefore the distortion that arises from grandiose assumptions come from the human context of interpersonal relationships. This is a naturalistic faith-claim.

The human possibility. Niebuhr's position is that self-fulfillment and the good life are a possibility in spite of the profundity of human pride. New life is restored by acknowledging the rightful role of the self in its relationship to God. Man is not God nor is he an animal. Man is the dimension of "the between." The human possibility is realized when man ceases to struggle

against God and accepts his place in the universe as little lower than the angels. It is in Jesus Christ that we see God's redeeming action of overcoming man's prideful rebellion.

Anderson affirms the Christian insight that the problem is to accept ourselves as we are rather than as we "ought" to be. Grandiosity is a sin because it prevents man from seeing himself as he really is. When persons view themselves better than other people and act on it, they dehumanize themselves and others. To be human is to make oneself vulnerable to the pain of becoming aware of one's false self image. Grandiosity distorts man's perception. The way out of this dilemma is to reshape man's perception by changing his assumptions about himself. Anderson offers an insightful process by which one can do this via her assumption-centered therapy.

There is a strong implication that pride as the source of the human problem can be solved by man himself. Anderson indicates that man can take care of his problems with the aid of rational insight and good will; that is, if by the process of therapy one can recognize his basic grandiose assumptions, then one can replace them with realistic ones. This, however, does not solve the problem of the need for ultimate values by which persons and

societies live. The underlying faith-claim is her confidence in man's capacity to fashion and transform society.

The ordering of life. For Niebuhr man is responsible for his actions and must face the consequences of them. Prideful behavior is made up of acts committed in a free decision. We always have a choice in spite of the anxiety issuing from man's self-contradictory nature. Man's life is to be ordered in the last analysis not by law but by the redeeming love of God. Thus, the tension of finiteness and freedom is maintained by God's love concretely revealed in history through Jesus Christ.

For Anderson human responsibility is limited to the realm of the finite power to change one's assumptions. Every person has the capacity to change his assumptions or beliefs provided he is made aware of them and has the motivation to change them. Values are an individual's basic set of assumptions. To change them means to reorient a person's perceptions and his life style.

The larger question to be raised concerns man having the freedom to choose values to shape his destiny. Since the self is identified with its values, the self cannot go beyond them. This suggests that the values which make up the self are a product of one's particular life situation. Hence, the self does not choose values

but rather receives and transmits them. So again we come up against a naturalist faith-claim.

The other side of the question about values is Anderson's failure to give them content. Anderson deals with the phenomena of values in relation to assumptions in human behavior, but does not distinguish between ultimate and relative values. Values are relative to one's interpersonal setting. What is important for her is that values be founded upon realistic assumptions based upon everyday life experiences. The conclusion to be drawn is that without reference to transcendent values with which to guide society and individuals, man must create his values by and for himself.

A fundamental insight that Anderson offers is a stress upon values which come from within a person's experience rather than from authority. Values for Anderson are authentic when they are a part of one's basic assumptions. Her emphasis upon inner values places value reorientation at the center of her psychotherapeutic approach. In changing the pride system of an individual a fundamental change is affected in his life style.

Anderson contributes significantly her wisdom about manipulative styles of life as over against authentic ones. She expresses the grandiose disguises of the

person who communicates helplessness, or the person who is always blaming others, or again a person who hides behind his guilt. These kinds of prideful behavior are destructive and need to be recognized as such.

CHAPTER V

PRIDE: A MODEL FOR PASTORAL COUNSELING

I. RELEVANCE OF PRIDE AS A MODEL

The relevance of chapter four in terms of pastoral counseling is that both pride as sin and pride as grandiosity attempt to reveal the depth and the breath of the human predicament. To put it another way, pride from a faith perspective and pride from a clinical stance are both concerned about what prevents man from reaching his potential. They are significant as models not only for pastoral counseling but for all counseling in general since the operational assumption in counseling begins with the human plight and the implicit hope of restoration to health and fulfillment.

Pastoral counseling distinguishes itself from psychotherapy significantly by its emphasis upon salvation rather than health. However, Edward Thornton feels that the uniqueness of pastoral counseling cannot be founded on this difference. He says that the boundary between health and salvation break down on the theoretical level in counseling.

From the perspective of the essential relation of health and salvation, a no-boundary exists. Stated propositionally: Health is potential in salvation, and salvation is potential in health.¹

Despite Thornton's useful clarification of the dialectic between health and salvation, he misses the essential point. The faith dimension, whether Christian or otherwise, determines one's perspective in counseling. Camilla Anderson, for example, considers the attainment of emotional health to be salvation as viewed from within her naturalistic and humanistic framework. Whereas Niebuhr sees restoration of man before God to be the ultimate goal of selfhood. However, the dialectic between health and salvation is relevant within the context of a revised model of pride in which the faith claims of grandiosity are divested and the sin of pride is given a dynamic base.

Definition of a model. Theology's relationship to psychotherapy needs to be more clearly defined if dialogue between Niebuhr and Anderson is to take place. The most viable working basis for a dialogue between theology and psychotherapy is a model of the human self rather than a body of truths given to man by divine authority. A concept of the self provides theology the means by which to interpret a wide range of human experience just as a model

¹Edward E. Thornton, Theology and Pastoral Counseling (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 69.

of self does for psychotherapy. Although theology's model of the self is shaped by its ultimate faith dimension, nevertheless, it interprets the same phenomena as psychotherapy. Moreover, understanding theology in this sense means that psychotherapy on its own merits be considered as a plausible interpretation of a whole range of human experience. From this viewpoint, theology and psychotherapy serve to correct one another. The theologian asks if the psychotherapist has correctly interpreted his data. The psychotherapist inquires whether the theologian needs to expand or revise his model.

What is the meaning of "a model?" Fred Berthold says that a model is not a picture of reality as commonly taken to be.² Rather a model is useful just because there is no reliable picture available. A model cannot be verified by comparing it with that to which it refers since there is no independent access to its referent. However, there are criteria for comparing a good model from a bad one. One such criterion is that there must be something in man's experience which fits in with the model. An example of this would be an experience in

²Fred Berthold, "Theology and Self-Understanding: The Christian Model of Man as Sinner," in Peter Homans (ed.) The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 13.

human life that would make it appropriate for man to conceive of God as a loving father, or again as a creator.

Another criterion says Berthold is adequacy.³

Although it is difficult to verify a model because of its unknown regions, it should not be contrary with what we do know. In this sense models operate like a scientific theory; that is, at some points a good model must be directly related to concrete experience. This provides some kind of consistency between the model and what it represents via human experience. A good example of such a model is the Fall story. It helps us to understand a wide range of human experience. Even though there are a lot of things suggested in the story that are inaccessible to our observation, there is much in the story which says something about human behavior that is open to our own experience.

Another criterion of a model is to help persons to better understand their experiences.⁴ A good model functions to integrate our everyday experience with our norms and precepts. A Christian for example needs a model to bridge his common experiences with the reality of the gospel. It is the particular function of theology to perform the task of interpreting human experience in light of biblical revelation.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

Sin of pride as a model. Niebuhr's model of sin as pride is one of the most penetrating studies of human evil in the 20th century. No serious student can make a study of sin without coming to grips with Niebuhr's understanding of sin as pride. There are a number of reasons why Niebuhr's model has so much to commend it.

In the first place sin as pride stands within a well-developed methodology; namely, the dialectical method. By this method Niebuhr is able to treat the problem of human disorder from opposite positions. The logic of the dialectical method is that contradictions and paradoxes are acknowledged and allowed to exist in themselves. William John Wolf describes Niebuhr's approach.

A somewhat stylized Niebuhrian analysis of a human problem is to state two opposite facets of the problem, then to reduce each further to negative and positive elements, to correlate the sub-negation of the basic affirmation with the sub-positive of the basic negation, then to show how the Christian answer meets these complexities, but only in the wholeness of the problem; for once any element of the Christian answer is emphasized at the expense of some other facet, distortion occurs. This pattern is the framework for Niebuhr's analysis of man's sin and his goodness in the light of grace which both represents God's forgiveness and his empowering of man.⁵

⁵William John Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bertall (eds.), Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 231-32.

Besides having the advantage of a good methodology, the model of sin as pride stands within one of the most articulate doctrines of man in contemporary theology. It is significant that Niebuhr's starting place is man, society and human experience as expressed in his most systematic book The Nature and Destiny of Man. Hans Hofmann says:

For Niebuhr the precise point at which the Gospel and the world confront one another is in man. Thus the focal point of Niebuhr's interest is in man. Though he does not ignore other facets of theological concern, from the start it was the doctrine of man, theological anthropology, that consumed his attention. The title of his chief work, The Nature and Destiny of Man, delivered as the Gifford Lectures when he was at the zenith of his influence, summarizes what was Niebuhr's central concern.⁶

Fred Berthold, a critic of the pride model, considers this model adequate on a descriptive level.

If the model [of pride] is considered as a description of human behavior, it has much to commend it. Here I would simply point to the impressive work of Reinhold Niebuhr, who has made a strong case for the view that this model is superior to the various forms of rationalism or idealism which tend to obscure man's devious and apparently inexhaustible self-interest.⁷

However, if Niebuhr's model of the sin of pride is to be an adequate model according to Berthold's

⁶ Hans Hofmann, "Reinhold Niebuhr," in Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (eds.), A Handbook of Christian Theologians (New York: World, 1965), p. 357.

⁷ Berthold, op. cit., p. 19.

criteria, then Niebuhr's pride-model breaks down because it lacks a dynamic explanation of the origins of pride.⁸ Moreover, Berthold criticizes the pride-model on the basis of its strategy to overcome the human plight. The typical strategy of the pride-model is to stress sin and man's conviction of his sin as a way of obtaining grace. Berthold adds that this is a serious distortion of the gospel to focus upon sin in this manner.

Implicit in the gospel is the awareness that it does no good simply to condemn man for his sin, for it is precisely that awareness which drives the religious man to seek to justify himself. Further, the gospel implies that the dynamic change from pride to love results from the conviction that God already loves and accepts us.⁹

Berthold appears to place Niebuhr with the traditional protestant Christological formulations which convict man of his sin. This is a misunderstanding on Berthold's part. He has not grasped Niebuhr's dialectical process of sin and grace and the dialectic within grace itself. Sin makes sense only in relation to grace and likewise grace makes sense only in relation to sin. Both have to be viewed together in order to understand one of them. Also, in grace God both loves and judges man at the same time. While confronting man's pride, God affirms man's existence. Thus, when man is convicted of his sin,

⁹Ibid., p. 31.

he is also forgiven. Niebuhr, too, emphasizes the gospel's insight that man is already forgiven in Jesus Christ.

Another reason why Berthold misrepresents Niebuhr's position is that if man is convicted because of his sin, then sin must be absolute and inevitable. Niebuhr views sin as inevitable but not necessary. It is man's choice that sin exists. Man's finitude does make him vulnerable to temptation and it invariably happens, but always through man's voluntary consent. Looking at it another way, man cannot eliminate sin entirely but man can do something about it in a significant way. Life is good in spite of sin and the reverse is true that sin exists in spite of the good. Thus, man is not eternally convicted by sin yet man can affirm the fact of sin without destroying himself.

Paul Lehmann in discussing Niebuhr's Christology points out that Niebuhr's primary intent in his works is to show how grace overcomes sin in human experience. Lehmann writes:

His theology, he [Niebuhr] once remarked, is actually intended to be nothing more than the analysis of the truth about Christus pro nobis and Christus in nobis in its significance for man.¹⁰

¹⁰ Paul Lehmann, "The Christology of Reinhold Niebuhr," in Kegley, op. cit., p. 253.

Niebuhr's main concern, then, is grace rather than sin. More specifically, Niebuhr focuses upon the overcoming of sin through grace and to articulate this not in theological discourse but to demonstrate its relevance in a whole range of human experience.

Niebuhr's strategy for reconciliation is spelled out in his two-dimensional understanding of "grace as power in, and mercy towards, man." Grace is power over man. It is a power from beyond man that breaks the hold of sin over man. God fulfills what man cannot do himself. God's power over man comes as mercy and forgiveness. In spite of man's prideful rebellion, God loves man and is ever calling man unto Himself.

Grace is power in man. God completes in man what man is destined to be. Power in man is wisdom that leads man in growth towards faith, love and hope. It is the power of the Holy Spirit that enables man to live with the ambiguity of sin.

Niebuhr spells out in remarkable fashion a Christian formulation of self-transformation. In chapter three it was shown that "Grace as mercy towards and power over" forms the basis for understanding human nature. Niebuhr applies the Pauline text Gal. 2:20 in describing the moral and spiritual experience of men.

I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the son of God who loved me, and gave himself for me.

According to Niebuhr, this Pauline text summarizes how grace transforms the prideful self into selfhood. The prideful self is disoriented by the shattering power of grace. The self becomes recentered through the affirming power of grace as forgiveness. The self is freed from the constrictions of self-concern and is freed for responsible action.

Grandiosity as a model. The inadequacy of grandiosity as a model was chiefly dwelt with in chapter four. The main conclusion to be drawn from that analysis is that a naturalistic notion of the self denies the transcendent capacity of man. It reduces man to a social animal.

Grandiosity as a model does provide a soteriological explanation of man's prideful behavior. With consistency Anderson asserts that grandiosity is the maintenance of respectable self and constructs a theory of personality around it in terms of human development and personality disorder.

Anderson's strategy for overcoming omnipotence in human behavior is through acceptance of one's actual functioning self. The way is to replace grandiose

assumptions which cause distorted perceptions of the self and others. Realistic assumptions are based upon experience rather than authority. Like Niebuhr, Anderson is concerned about man's accepting his finitude. However, Anderson has failed to come to grips with man's freedom.

II. A REVISED MODEL OF PRIDE

Niebuhr's self-transcendent model of pride and Anderson's self-dynamic model of pride complement one another when viewed from the common denominator of human evil. Grandiosity and the sin of pride are both conceptions of human evil. From this vantage point the fundamental differences can be detected which in turn allows the possibility of integrating the practical wisdom of grandiosity with the faith claims of the sin of pride.

Pride as historical evil. Niebuhr's self-transcendent model is a conception of human evil that arises out of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation. God created the world as good. Man as creature within creation is good. This means that man's finiteness is good and not evil. Sin of pride as human evil arises out of man's freedom to choose his destiny. Thus, sin of pride is an intrusion into a good creation by way of human freedom. It is a perversion of man's existence rather than a necessary condition of it. Sin of pride, then, is

a historical category in which man responds or does not respond to God's action in the world.

Although sin of pride is a historical category, it rests upon a biblical ontology of man based upon the idea of creation.¹¹ That is to say, the concept of creation provides a prior analysis of man's essential being as creature out of which arises man's freedom. The two fundamental aspects of man as creature are his dependence and his spirit. They are so interwoven in man that he is free even in his creaturely dependence, and yet conditioned in his freedom. Like all other creatures, man's dependence is total. His whole existence in time and space comes to him from beyond himself. Perhaps a better way of stating it is that the total structure of man's being as a creature roots his life beyond himself, in God the creator. Man's capacity for self-transcendence shares completely in this radical dependence of creaturely life. The spirit of man cannot be the self-sufficient center of man's life because his intellectual, moral and spiritual capacities are not divine powers set arbitrarily within creaturely flesh. Man is a total unity, and so his spirit, like his flesh, is a creaturely, dependent spirit. Thus the human spirit as a capacity of a

¹¹Langdon Gilkey, The Maker of Heaven and Earth (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 228-30.

dependent creature, can fulfill itself only when it points beyond itself to God, the ultimate source of man's existence. We can say then, that the wholeness of man comes when his freedom is in unity with his creaturely dependence, when his spiritual capacities find rootage in God. The first and second commandments sum up man's ontological existence. It expresses not only the obligation of man to God but man's essential nature as a free creature dependent upon God for his being: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and love thy neighbor as thyself." In the fulfillment of this commandment man is in unity with God and himself. In such unity the insecurity and anxiety of man's creaturely existence are stripped of their terror. Through faith in God's love, man is able to live a meaningful existence. Under the conditions set by the first commandment, the second becomes possible. Instead of the fear of our neighbor on whom we are dependent, we may now love him as ourselves.

Pride as ontological evil. Anderson's self-dynamic model of pride is an ontological category of human experience. "The human being is and must remain

inescapably grandiose, prideful, vain and egotistical."¹² Grandiosity, then, is a given of human behavior. In this regard grandiosity is a fully intelligible aspect of human experience. As an ontological category, it may be the source of either good or evil. However, Anderson dwells on the negative aspects of grandiosity in human behavior. She seems to be unaware that there is a positive side to grandiosity.

Pride as historical and ontological categories.

It would appear that the presuppositions of grandiosity conflicts with sin of pride both ontologically and historically. However, a closer look at the premises of grandiosity indicate an ontological similarity to that of sin of pride. Reinterpreted, grandiosity can be identified as the will-to-live. The self seeks to assure its survival by preserving a good self-image. Seen in this light, the dynamic of grandiosity is the need of human beings to affirm self-worth. Without self-affirmation the human organism ceases to be. The degree to which the self is not loved, the more the self seeks to compensate for it, even though living by an unrealistic past, do not elicit from others the desired affirmations. Restated,

¹²Camilla Anderson, "Assumption-Centered Psychotherapy" (Frontera: California Institution for Women, 1966), p. 1.

the ontological basis of grandiosity is the need of persons to be loved.

Reinterpreting grandiosity in this way is similar to Niebuhr's assertion that the split in man's nature is healed by Divine love. In this context Anderson points out the need for self-affirmation. Niebuhr goes beyond this and says that self-affirmation is rooted in God's love of man. Both grandiosity and sin of pride point to man's need for the gospel. God in Jesus Christ has already fulfilled this need.

Granted that on ontological grounds sin of pride and grandiosity complement one another; however, sin of pride clashes with grandiosity at the point of human freedom. Sin of pride is historical because it takes its stand in man's capacity to rebel against God. Grandiosity, on the other hand, confines freedom to choice within causal laws. The self is shaped by nature itself. This is a basic conflict between rival faith claims, so this naturalistic assertion about grandiosity must be rejected.

To summarize, pride is both existential and essential. It's essence is found in the lack of being loved. It points to man's need for self-justification. Pride is existential. It is a person's decision to choose his life-style. Pride manifests itself in all kinds of

disguises and deception. It seeks the sanctuary of self-respect on the one hand and on the other power over others.

III. SELFHOOD: A DIRECTION FOR PASTORAL COUNSELING

It would be a mistake if pastoral counseling should pattern itself after a medical model with its stress on abnormal behavior. Rather, pastoral counseling must take its perspective from its faith with its orientation towards transformation and growth of the total man. It is the conviction of this writer that Niebuhr offers pastoral counseling a Christian perspective from which to operate. The goal of pastoral counseling is to attain selfhood. Three stages characterize selfhood: alienation, finitude and freedom. Niebuhr's analysis of pride underlie these three stages. The practical wisdom of Anderson's theory of grandiosity provide the means to attain selfhood.

Alienation. The first stage of pastoral counseling is concerned with the problem of alienation. This is a state of existence in which the finite self and the self as spirit are no longer held in tension. They are out of touch with each other. This result of this estrangement is a distortion of the self-image. The self perceives the world through the colored glasses of the ideal

self-image rather than through the actual functioning self. This gap between what a person is and what he thinks he ought to be means that the good self-image must compensate for its good self-image by protecting its grandiose assumptions. This gap between the ideal self and the actual self is the source of basic anxiety which surfaces within the counselee in love-rejection feelings about oneself, others or both. This intolerable pain is the source of a person's seeking help for himself.

Anderson's reality orientation is useful to the pastor because it gives him an effective short-term counseling model. The pastor begins where the counselee is. He centers on the problem no matter what it may be and is accompanied by all kinds of negative feelings. The pastor, although dealing with the immediate predicament of the counselee, acknowledges the feelings attached to the issue and helps the counselee to articulate them. These feelings are signals of underlying grandiose assumptions. By getting at them the counselor can deal with the illusions which the counselee has about himself and others.

Finitude. The movement towards selfhood begins with the realization that the self is not God, is not absolute in power, knowledge or responsibility. The illusions which stem from Godlike desires leave the self

cut off from its own being. The way to overcome the alienated self is to help the troubled individual to accept the unacceptable, limited, dependent and creaturely self. The basis of this acceptance of the finite self is through the quality of relationship between pastor and counselee. If the pastor is unable to affirm the unloved finite self, then it is not possible for the counselee to do so. The pastor is the channel of God's grace and it is his "given" power to care for the self which the counselee himself has denied. The pastor is the bridge by which the counselee learns to accept and love himself as creature. For the counselee to accept his finite self a learning process is required so that he makes contact with his own feelings, body and with other persons.

The experience of finitude is a reflected one rather than an immediate experience. Finitude is the boundary where one senses his limit. It is the point where one cannot move nor directly apprehend what is beyond it. Dr. Gordon D. Kaufman describes the precise nature of the experience of finitude.

All that we ever experience directly are particular events of suffering, death (of others), joy, peace, etc. It is only in reflection upon these and the attempt to understand ourselves in the light of these happenings that we become aware of our limitedness on all sides. Along with this awareness of our being hemmed in, powerful emotions of terror, despair, revulsion, anxiety, and the like, are often

perhaps always generated, and this total intellectual-emotional complex may then be called the "experience" of radical contingency is not an immediate awareness of restriction, as when one butts one's head directly against a stone wall; it depends rather upon a generalization from such occasional immediate experiences of limitation to the total situation of the self. The self, in this way perceived as hemmed in on all sides, comes to a new and deeper awareness of its nature and powers: it is finite, master neither of itself nor of its world. Thus, the so-called experience of finitude or contingency, however powerful the emotions which accompany and deepen and reinforce it, has an intellectual root, and it is possible only because man is a reflective being.¹³

Professor Kaufman's insight into the phenomena of finitude points up the importance of reflection for pastoral counseling upon the physical, mental and psychological experiences of finiteness. This provides an important theoretical foundation for pastoral counseling in which the pastor brings to bear his faith perspective on the immediate experiences of his counselee.

Freedom.

To love our illusions and accept the rules of the game of life is a prerequisite to human freedom and responsibility. As long as we harbor claims and illusions of omnipotence, we judge both our successes and failures, our responsibilities and limitations, by fantastic standards which we inevitably fall short of. But once we accept the limitations that constitute the human condition we become free to explore the possible.

¹³Gordon D. Kaufman, "On the Meaning of God: Transcendence without Mythology," in Martin E. Marty (ed.), New Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1967), IV, 81.

To accept the rules of the game is not equivalent to mere resignation. Rather, it is to live in an attitude of wonder. Once we are able to confess that we are not the center of the world, we perceive things in an altogether new way. We are set free to admire rather than possess, to enjoy rather than exploit, to accept rather than grasp. In the attitude of wonder we experience life as a gift.¹⁴

Sam Keen expresses beautifully the final stage of self-hood. Freedom, responsibility, wonder, gratitude and hope are a possibility where there is a vivid awareness of the tragic limitations of human existence.

Perhaps it is useful to retrace again the movement of the self in its development toward selfhood. Through its pretence, the self abuses its intrinsic freedom by denying its finitude. The result is alienation from within and without. It drives the self to seek power to maintain its good self image rather than functioning at a reality level. The need to maintain self-respect means also to control others so that they conform to one's self image. However, through support and affirmation, the self is able to accept the limitations of its existence. When the self abandons its fantastic claims, it discovers the power to create meaning which, however, is limited on the one hand by the fragility of human life and on the other by the givenness of the world into which it emerged.

¹⁴Sam Keen, "Hope in a Posthuman Era," in Marty, op. cit., V, 85.

The acceptance of the unacceptable self-image posits a ground for hope. Sam Keen says:

When realism prevails and we acknowledge that our infantile strivings to have dominion over all things are doomed to failure, the question of God inevitably arises. If I am not the source of a deathless and victorious power, is there any such power? If I am not God, is there a God? Is there any force, mind or person working at the heart of things to accomplish what I desire but cannot achieve; to bring order out of chaos, meaning out of contingency, triumph out of tragedy? Or is human history "a tale told by an idiot"?

The question of God is not the question of the existence of some remote infinite being. It is the question of the possibility of hope. The affirmation of faith in God is the acknowledgment that there is a deathless source of power and meaning that can be trusted to nurture and preserve all created good. To deny that there is a God is functionally equivalent to denying that there is any ground for hope.¹⁵

Sam Keen gives us a clue as to how the faith perspective of the pastor can interpret the counselee's experience of finitude in ultimate categories. Hope in the context of pastoral counseling begins with the realization that human experience is finally inadequate to deal with all the possibilities that reality encompasses. Hope, therefore, is to take experience seriously but not to absolutize it. Within this frame of reference the self is made free to affirm the unknowable. It is open to new possibilities. The self lives for the future through the present.

¹⁵Ibid., V, 87.

Freedom like finitude is reflected experience rather than immediate experience of growth and release. The self is no longer imprisoned under the "ought" and "should" of the ideal self. The idealized self is re-centered so that it functions alongside the actual self. This new locus is the "real self." It is the new creature who lives creatively within the tension of its freedom and finiteness.

Thus the real self is freedom from the bondage of the idealized self but at the same time freed to love and to be responsible within its realized limitations. The grandiose assumptions which have been brought to light and confronted in loving concern are substituted for realistic ones. It would be a mistake if by realistic assumptions we were to mean those based upon cultural values of society. These substituted assumptions must come out of tested experience of life and the reflected experience of pastoral counseling.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The significance of this study is that it brings the Christian concept of sin of pride to bear on the nature and practice of pastoral counseling. The Christian view of selfhood directs the movement of the self in bondage to a responsible, loving self. Pride as a model for pastoral counseling finds its healing power in divine grace working through the faith perspective of the pastor.

The wisdom of psychotherapy regarding man's omnipotent behavior is integrated with Christian faith claims to construct a working model for pastoral counseling. Grandiosity explains why human behavior is destructive and points to a methodology by which assumptions founded upon illusions about the self and others may be replaced by assumptions based upon reflected experiences.

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